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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals is based on Section 78-2a-3(2)(j) as
a case transferred from the Utah Supreme Court.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The following issues are presented for consideration by this Appeal:
1.

a.

Issue.

Did the district court err in holding that there was a

independent power of arrest in Miles Langley as a Colorado bail enforcement agent under
the bail bond contract so that the Utah bond agent licensing statute Section 53-11-107(2),
U.C.A., requiring a bond agent to be licensed could be ignored with the result that the court
incorrectly instructed the jury on the law of arrest?
b.

Standard of Review. The trial court's application of law will be

reviewed on a correctness standard with instructions to the jury reversed if an instruction
was prejudicial in that it misadvised or misled the jury on the law. Butler v. Naylor, 1999
UT 86, 987 P.2d 41. Jury instructions are examined in their entirety and will be affirmed
if the instruction taken as a whole fairly instructs the jury on the law applicable to the case.
Paulos v. Covenant Transport, Inc., 2004 Ut. App. 35, 86 P.3d 752.
2.

a.

Issue. If Defendant Langley was without a right to arrest because he

did not have a Utah bail enforcement agent license, did the district court err in dismissing
the cause of action for false imprisonment where the jury instructions pertaining to the
power to make a lawful arrest were also contrary to law?
vi

b.

Standard of Review. The trial court's application of law will be

reviewed on a correctness standard with instructions to the jury reversed if an instruction
was prejudicial in that it misadvised or misled the jury on the law. Butler v. Naylor, 1999
UT 86, 987 P.2d 41. Jury instructions are examined in their entirety and will be affirmed
if the instruction taken as a whole fairly instructs the jury on the law applicable to the case.
Paulos v. Covenant Transport, Inc., 2004 Ut. App. 35, 86 P.3d 752.
3.

a.

Issue. Whether the district court erred as a matter of law in declining

to enter a default against Robert Thorpe when he failed to show for trial and had placed
no excuse therefor on the record nor had he requested any accommodation of the court.
b.

Standard of Review. As explained in Valley Leasing, a Div. of

Intermountain Loan Corp. v. Houghton, 661 P.2d 959 (Utah 1983), the decision on whether
a default should have been entered is a matter of discretion of the trial court with this court
reviewing to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion.
4.

a.

Issue. Did the trial court err as a matter of law when it ruled that

plaintiff George Lee could not testify that he heard Defendant Langley testify in a justice
court trial that Langley did not have a Utah bail enforcement agent license?
b.

Standard of Review. The standard of review in determining whether

a court has ruled correctly on evidence is an abuse of discretion standard. Eggert v.
Wasatch Energy Corp., 2004 Ut. 28, 94 P.3d 193.

vii

5.

a.

Issue. Did the district court err as a matter of law in refusing to admit

into evidence the original of the receipt signed by Robert Thorpe by holding that Plaintiffs
failed to show that Robert Thorpe was unavailable so as to not be within an exception to
the hearsay rule?
b.

Standard of Review. The standard of review in determining whether

a court has ruled correctly on evidence is an abuse of discretion standard. Eggert v.
Wasatch Energy Corp., 2004 Ut. 28, 94 P.3d 193.
DETERMINATIVE LAW
Plaintiffs claim the following controls resolution of the issues presented:
A.

Section 31A-35-601, U.C.A. (1999).

B.

Title 53, Chapter 11, U.C.A. (1999).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

NATURE OF THE CASE. This is a tort action by two men who were assaulted by

a Colorado bail enforcement agent at the home of one of them in Utah for assault, false
imprisonment, and negligence or reckless endangerment.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. The incident which is the subject of this suit

occurred on April 2,1999. The Plaintiffs filed a pro se complaint with the Eighth District
Court in Uintah County on February 28, 2000. R., p.3. Addendum A All Defendants
eventually answered the complaint with Defendant Langley answering pro se. (R., p. 22).
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Defendant, Ranger Insurance Company subsequently made a Cross-claim on March 7,
2002 against Defendants Thorpe and Langley. (R., p. 114).
In March 2002, current counsel for Plaintiffs appeared for the first time. (R., p. 116).
Counsel for Robert Thorpe withdrew. (R., p. 140). The case was configured thereafter
with Plaintiffs and Ranger Insurance Company having legal counsel and Defendants
Thorpe and Langley acting pro se.
Discovery proceeded but Thorpe failed to show for his deposition and sanctions
were sought by the Plaintiffs in August, 2002. (R., p. 171). The sanctions were never
imposed after representations to the court by the wife of Thorpe that he had health
problems.

(R., p. 240).

However, Thorpe also failed to respond to Request for

Admissions. (R., p. 356).
Trial was held before a jury for three days commencing February 2, 2004. During
the course of the trial the court dismissed Plaintiffs' cause of action for false imprisonment.
(Trial Transcript (TT) at R. p. 1187 at pp. 213-216).

The assault and reckless

endangerment claims were presented to the jury. (See Jury Instructions R. pp. 10321034.)
Robert Thorpe failed to show for the trial. The court denied the request of Plaintiffs
to enter his default. (TT at R. p. 1187, p. 34). The court did grant the motion at trial of
Defendant Ranger Insurance Company to enter the default of Robert Thorpe on the crossclaim brought by Ranger and later entered a formal order. (R., p. 1261).
ix

This Court entered final judgment upon Plaintiffs' claims on March 17,2004. (R., p.
1067). A Notice ofAppeal was filed April 14, 2004. (R., p. 1143). Subsequently, Ranger
Insurance Company caused a formal judgment to be entered against Robert Thorpe upon
its cross-claim on October 13, 2004. (R., p. 1261). To be cautious about being sure the
new judgment against Thorpe long after trial did not create a new appeal time, a Second
Notice ofAppeal was filed by Plaintiffs on November 12, 2004.
C.

DISPOSITION OF TRIAL COURT. A jury verdict of no cause of action was entered

against the Plaintiffs on February 4, 2004. (R., p. 1053). The formal judgment followed
on March 17, 2004. (R., p. 1067). The judgment rendered was upon Plaintiffs causes for
assault and reckless endangerment with the false imprisonment claim having been
dismissed at trial as a matter of law.

RELEVANT FACTS
A.

THE PLAYERS.
George Lee, plaintiff and appellant is a resident of Uintah County, Utah.

(Complaint, R., p. 3 and Addendum A).
Gerald Lee, plaintiff and appellant, is the brother of George Lee and also resides
in Uintah County, Utah. (Complaint, R., p.3).
Miles Langley was a past police officer in the Grand Junction Colorado area, a
sometimes bar bouncer, and a sometimes bail enforcement agent or bounty hunter. (TT,
R„ p. 1187 at pp. 58-62).
x

Robert Thorpe was the owner of A-1 Bail Bonds located in Grand Junction,
Colorado. His wife, Maria Thorpe, was also an agent with him. (Plaintiff Exhibit 2, p. 1.
R., p. 999 in Addendum C).
Ranger Insurance Company is an insurer operating as a bail bond surety for A-1
Bail Bonds that had entered agency contracts with Robert and Maria Thorpe. Ranger
Insurance Company was not licensed to be a bail bond surety within the state of Utah.
(TT, R.,p. 1187 at 266).
B.

THE EVENTS.
Gerald Lee was arrested for driving under the influence and driving without proof of

insurance in late 1998 in the Grand Junction, Colorado area. He jailed in Grand Junction
Colorado and released on bail issued by A-1 Bail Bonds operated by Robert Thorpe.
(Gerald Lee testimony at TT, R., p. 1187 at pp. 105-106). Despite posting bail, Gerald
missed his court appearances in Colorado. (Lee testimony at TT, R., p. 1187 at pp. 109110).
Langley was hired by Robert Thorpe to go get Gerald Lee for jumping bail. (Langley
Testimony, TT, R., p. 1187 at pp. 73-78). Thorpe and Langley knew Gerald was in Utah.
Langley left Colorado for Utah with the intent of enforcing a Colorado arrest warrant. He
first checked in with local police in the Uintah County area and then went alone to the
home of George Lee, the brother of Gerald, in Naples, Utah.

xi

Langley knocked on the door and George answered. Langley said he was from
Christian Construction Company and was looking for a good mechanic to hire and heard
that Gerald was looking for work. George invited him into the house through a door into
the kitchen area. Gerald came into the room and Langley again repeated he was from a
construction company and had a job for Gerald and extended his had as if to shake hands.
Gerald extended his hand in response and Langley suddenly produced and placed a
handcuff on Gerald's arm. Gerald reacted by pushing Langley back and Langley, a very
large man, struck Gerald. George reacted to protect his brother and grabbed Langley.
The facts diverge here but the Lees say that Langley never said he was a bail enforcement
agent and Langley admitted to that in the Answer he filed with the court, Langley Answer,
(R., p.22).

Lees were reacting to a stranger suddenly attacking Gerald. (See Lee

testimony TT, R., p. 1187 at pp. 111-118; 189-195).
A short fight followed in which Langley beat up Gerald pretty well and left George
unconscious on the floor of the kitchen in a pool of blood. Gerald testified that Langley
dragged him out of the house literally by the heels with his head banging on the floor and
steps of the porch as he was taken outside to Langley's vehicle. (TT, R., p. 1187 at p.
117).
George testified that he awoke and called the sheriff's office to report a kidnaping,
still unaware Langley claimed to act under any legal authority. The police responded and
cited both Langley and the Lees for assault of each other. (TT, R., p. 1187 at p. 194).
xii

Langley took Gerald to the hospital in Uintah County for examination. A neck brace
was placed on him and a general examination of his bruises was made. Gerald was
released to the custody of Langley who put Gerald in his pickup truck and took him through
a terrible snow storm over dangerous roads back to Grand Junction. Gerald was examined
again in a hospital in Grand Junction. (TT, R., p. 1187 at pp. 123-129).
Gerald bailed out of the jail again by using Robert Thorpe. Gerald testified out of
the presence of the jury that he saw Thorpe hand Langley the cash for bringing him back
to Utah and saw Thorpe execute a receipt for the prisoner and note payment to Langley.
(TT, R., p. 1187 at pp. 276-278).
A trial was subsequently held in the Uintah County Justice Court for all three
Defendants at the same time. Langley was convicted of assault. George and Gerald Lee
were acquitted of any crime. (R. p. 45).
Ranger Insurance Company was the bond surety in Colorado for the Lee bail
through A-1 Bail Bonds and Robert Thorpe. (Plaintiff Trial Exhibit 1, R., p. 999). Ranger
is not licensed to underwrite bail bonds in Utah. (TT, R., p. 1187 at p. 266).
Plaintiffs brought this action against the Defendants for negligence or reckless
conduct, false imprisonment, and assault. (Complaint, R., p. 3 and R., p. 322).
Other significant events occurred just before and during the trial which bear on this
appeal. First, Miles Langley died so his testimony was presented by deposition. Second,
Robert Thorpe failed to appear for trial. The court denied a motion by the Plaintiffs to have
xiii

his default entered but granted the motion in favor of Ranger Insurance Company on their
cross-claim for a default in judgment for failure to appear and defend. (Tt. R., p. 1187 at
pp. 34 and 227).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs show in this Brief that their trial went awry when the court made a
fundamental error in determining that there is common law authority for Colorado bail
recovery agent Langley to act in Utah. Once the court decided that, Plaintiffs' false
imprisonment claim was dismissed and their assault and reckless endangerment claim
became impossible to win because the court instructed the jury that if it found Langley
acted for Ranger Insurance Company that Langley had a right to make the arrest and use
the appropriate force with that.
This Brief explains that there was no legal right for Langley to act as a bail recovery
agent in Utah which has licensing requirements. The court compounded the error by
excluding from evidence testimony that Langley admitted to having no Utah license and
by excluding from evidence a hand-written receipt Defendant Thorpe created proving that
he had hired Langley as an agent to act in his behalf.
Finally, this Brief explains that the court abused its discretion by refusing to default
Robert Thorpe for failure to appear at trial where he had a pattern of not participating in the
litigation yet the court was willing to enter the default of Thorpe on the cross-claim of the
Defendant Ranger Insurance Company.
xiv

ARGUMENT
A.

INTRODUCTION
This appeal presents extraordinarily interesting legal questions that can safely be

said do not arise very often at all. Plaintiffs believe that a primary cause of the adverse jury
decision was the way the court interpreted and applied legal principles governing the power
to make an arrest. This brief will show that the court committed reversible error in its
interpretation of the law and in ruling on two key points of evidence.
B.

THEORY OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs presented at trial through the evidence, a trial brief, and jury instructions

theories of liability which they believe to be consistent with applicable law. (See R., p. 836
and 985). This Court needs to understand the Plaintiffs' theory of the case at trial in order
to appreciate where the trial court went wrong.
Plaintiffs divided facts and legal concepts between each of them at trial because
they had a significant difference in their legal status. Gerald Lee was a fugitive from the
state of Colorado on a misdemeanor warrant. George Lee had no pending charge in
Colorado and the entry and assault took place in George's home. Langley, Thorpe, and
Ranger Insurance had no legal authority to be operating in Utah. Consequently, the arrest
by Langley was without lawful authority and, in fact, specifically contrary to Utah law. With
no lawful authority, the seizure of at least Gerald Lee and, arguably, George Lee by
entering his home and knocking him unconscious, presented a valid claim of false

imprisonment. Langley's acts without justification in law eliminated any defenses to his
physical force constituting an assault.
Finally, Plaintiffs relied upon a Utah statute that makes a bond surety responsible
for acts of the bail enforcement bond agent to impute liability to Ranger Insurance
Company. The doctrine of respondeat superior would also apply.
C.

THERE WAS NO POWER OF ARREST.
1.

Legal Framework.

With the text contained in Addendum B, the court's attention is drawn to certain
specific statutes in the Utah Code that were in effect at the time of this incident. Note that
there have been some revisions to Title 77, Chapter 20 since this incident. All references
are to Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, in effect in 1999 when the arrest took
place.
Specifically, Section 77-20-8.5(2) provides that bond sureties may arrest a
defendant at any time before exoneration at any place within the state. Note also that
subsection (3) provides that a surety acting under this section is subject to the provisions
of Title 53, Chapter 10, discussed below.

(Addendum B).

While Title 77 governs criminal arrest procedure, Title 53 governs the licensing and
powers of bail enforcement agents. When one turns to Title 53, Chapter 10 as directed
by Section 77-20-8.5, it is immediately observed that this statute is wrong in its reference.
The appropriate chapter of Title 53 is Chapter 11. That chapter, known as the Bail Bond
2

Recovery Act, gives a comprehensive legal framework for the business operations of bail
bond agents. What jumps out immediately is the fundamental requirement in Section 5311-107 that there are three classes of licenses and no person may act as a bail
enforcement agent or bail recovery agent without holding a Utah license. Section 53-11108,109 and 111 go on to set the training and education requirements of bail enforcement
agents and bail recovery agents. (See Addendum B).
Title 53, Chapter 11, imposes requirements relevant to this appeal on bail
enforcement agents in how they do their job.

Section 53-11-120 requires a bail

enforcement agent upon request to identify his employer. Section 53-11-122 states that
in order to make an arrest a bail enforcement agent shall so identify himself to the person
being arrested after notifying local police authority.
An examination of Title 53, Chapter 11, shows that there is no legal authority
whatsoever for a person not licensed in Utah to make a bail related arrest. Put simply,
there is no exception for Langley enforcing a Colorado warrant in Utah.
The best that could be said for Langley's legal status would that he acted in making
a citizen's arrest. Section 77-7-3 provides that a private person may arrest another when
there has been a public offense committed or attempted in his presence or when a felony
has been committed and he has reasonable cause to believe the person arrested has
committed it. Section 77-7-7 declares that a peace officer can use force in making an

3

arrest only after the person being arrested flees or forcibly resists after being informed of
the intention to make the arrest.
With no state authority for a Colorado bail enforcement agent to make an arrest in
Utah, the only remaining arguable authority for making the arrest is found in federal law
and was a major issue at the trial as explained below.
In Taylor v. Taintor, 89 U.S. 366 (1872) a person was arrested in Connecticut and
released upon bail. His bail conditions allowed him to go to New York but, while there, he
was arrested and extradited to Maine for a crime. The Connecticut court sought to collect
on the bail bond and the surety attempted to avoid paying claiming that it was impossible
to now bring the fugitive back. The court considered the nature of a bail bond contract and
said in dicta that the bond principal or defendant is regarded as having been delivered by
the state to the custody of the surety. The surety retains common law power under the
bond contract to pursue the defendant into another state for return to the court, so there
was no legal impossibility to excuse paying the bond.
An examination of the trial exhibits shows that the Ranger Insurance Company bond
forms completed in connection with the Gerald Lee bail recite a right to apprehend Lee.
(Plaintiff Trial Exhibit 2, at R., p. 999 in Addendum C).
Finally, of strong importance in this case is Title 31 A, Chapter 35, the Bail Bond
Surety Licensing Act. In particular, Section 31A-35-601(2) provides that the acts or
conduct of any bail bond agent or bail enforcement agent, or bail recovery agent are
4

considered to be the acts or conduct of the bail bond surety. Put in the context of this
case, if Langley worked for Thorpe and Thorpe was an agent for Ranger Insurance
Company, the acts of Langley and Thorpe are absolutely imputed to the Ranger Insurance
Company.
2.

Langley Acted Outside the Law.

The court ruled early on in the trial that the Utah licensing statute would not be used
to determine whether Langley had authority to arrest. (TT, R., p. 1187 at 4-7, 9-12). This
early ruling, before any evidence was presented, effectively mortally wounded the Plaintiffs'
theory of the case, described above. Consistent with that ruling, Jury Instructions no. 25
and 26 were given over the objection of the plaintiff's counsel. (TT, R., p. 1187 at pp. 291,
238,291-292). Jury instructions proffered by the Plaintiffs were rejected. (See Addendum
D. R., pp. 901-906).
The instructions given essentially inform the jury that the law was that if Ranger
Insurance delegated authority to apprehend to Miles Langley, Langley had the power to
lawfully make an arrest. (R., pp. 1028, 1029 in Addendum D). What the court did, in
essence, was apply its understanding of Taylor v. Taintor to the effect that if Gerald Lee
had entered a contract with the surety then the only issue was whether the surety had
authorized Langley to go get Lee. (TT, R., p. 1187 at pp. 215-217).
This view by the court of the authority to arrest also caused the court to dismiss the
claim for false imprisonment brought by both Plaintiffs. (TT, R., p. 1187 at 213-216).
5

There really is no doubt that Miles Langley did not have the power to arrest. As
explained above, Utah has a comprehensive set of statutes in place which govern the
licensing of a bail enforcement agent and even make it a Class A Misdemeanor to act as
a bail enforcement agent without a license in Utah. Appellants are in a very difficult
position because they are being asked to prove a negative. That is, when the court
dismissed application of Title 53, it shifts conceptually the burden onto the plaintiff to show
that there is no bar to an out-of-state person coming into Utah and making a bail arrest.
Instead, the District Court should have applied the plain language of Title 53 and required
Langley to have a license.
Taylor v. Taintor does not provide a refuge for defendants. That case was decided
in the absence of any express statutes which were put into play in the decision. Instead,
that case can be read as having said in dicta there is a common law right of bail bondsman
to pursue fugitives into other states.
That Taylor does not have application here is found by looking at several cases in
other states.

In Walker v. Commonwealth, 127 S.W.3d 596 (KY. 2004) the court

considered the conviction of a bond enforcement agent from Ohio making an arrest in
Kentucky without a warrant. The bondsman raised Taylor v. Taintor as a defense saying
he had the right to come into Kentucky to make the arrest for the Ohio court. The
Kentucky court rejected the argument completely by finding that the Kentucky statute

6

prohibiting the arrest of persons by bondsman without a warrant abolished the common
law rule of Taylor. Similarly, the Utah Title 53 would abolish the Taylor common law rule.
In McFarland v. State, 666 N.W.2d 631 (Iowa App. 2003), a bounty hunter from
Iowa made an arrest in Iowa out of which he was charged with assaulting the subject
fugitive. The bounty hunter raised as a defense the Taylor case pointing out that the dicta
in that case creates common law that the fugitive can be pursued just about anywhere and
the bounty hunter may break and enter his home for that purpose. The Iowa court
correctly pointed out that the Taylor case lends no support whatsoever for the proposition
a bounty hunter has some authority to break into the home of an innocent party and
assault him or her. Similarly, the Taylor case would give no authority for Langley to enter
the home of George Lee and assault him while apprehending Gerald Lee.
In Green v. State, 829 S.W.2d 222 (Texas App. 1992), a defendant in a murder
case raised Taylor v. Taintor in support of a mistake of law defense. The Texas court
pointed out that Texas statutes governing sureties who seek to apprehend principals had
replaced the common law of Taylor. Again, Utah has adopted Title 53 which also
abrogates the application of Taylor.
Finally, in Johnson v. County of Kittitas, 11 P.3d 862 (Wash. App. 2001), the court
considered a bail bondsman who seized a defendant simply because the bondsman felt
threatened that the defendant may skip on the bond. The bondsman relied on Taylor v.
Taintor to argue that a surety had a right to pick up the subject as they believed necessary
7

to protect the bond contract. The court rejected the argument stating, as did the other
states, that the adoption of a Washington state statute concerning the authority of a bail
bondsman supplanted the common law rule of Taylor v. Taintor.
In summary, no legal authority existed for Miles Langley to come into Utah and
arrest Gerald Lee much less enter the home and assault George Lee. Utah has adopted
an absolute requirement that those who seek to enforce bail bonds must have a license
to do so after qualifying under Title 53, Chapter 11. With no offense committed in the
presence of Langley in Utah, there was no right of citizen's arrest. The old federal common
law right of a bail bondsman to pursue a fugitive in another state was eliminated by the
adoption of Title 53.
With all of the predicate legal principles in mind, the reversible error of the district
court can be brought into sharp focus. Plaintiffs' theory of the case under Utah law was
that Langley had no legal authority to be in Utah making an arrest therefore he could be
liable for false imprisonment through false arrest, he could be liable for assault because
he was using force in a situation in which he had no right to assert force, and he could be
liable for negligence or reckless endangerment because he was purporting to carry out a
duty without legal authority. By holding that there was a common law right of interstate
apprehension pursuant to the contract documents, the trial court was wrong on the law and
instructed the jury wrong when it said all they had to do to find lawful arrest authority was
to find the contract authorized Langley to act. There is no known authority for the
8

proposition that parties can get together in one state and contract away the public policy
and statutes of another state, yet that is what the court allowed in this trial.
No stretch of logic is necessary to conclude that if the jury had been properly
instructed that Langley had no legal authority to be in Utah, that they could have found
favorable for the Plaintiffs. A new trial with the jury instructed consistent with Utah law is
justified.
D.

FALSE IMPRISONMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED.
The elements of false imprisonment or false arrest were given long ago in Hepworth

v. Covey Bros. Amusement Company, 91 P.2d 507 (Utah 1939). The court stated there
that false imprisonment by false arrest occurs when any exercise of force, or express or
implied threat of force, by which in fact the other person is deprived of his liberty,
compelled to remain where he does not wish to remain or go where he does not wish to
go, is an imprisonment. These foundational elements were elaborated upon in McFarland
v. Skaggs Companies, Inc., 678 P.2d 298 (Utah 1984), wherein the court said that a lawful
arrest must be done in accordance with "statutory dictates".
Put simply, an arrest in Utah is a false arrest or false imprisonment where there is
no specific authority to make the arrest.
As explained in the preceding section, Miles Langley had no authority to arrest
Gerald Lee in Utah. Certainly, even if there was some authority found in the law to arrest
Gerald Lee, Langley is not given any authority to falsely imprison George Lee in his own
9

home. It is a question of fact that the jury could have found that George Lee, by exercise
offeree of Miles Langley, was deprived of his liberty or compelled to remain by the force.
The error of the trial court was to not even let the jury consider that false
imprisonment claim through finding Miles Langley had a right to act under the common law
surrounding the bail bond contract. The district court was wrong on the law completely.
Instead of instructing the jury that if Miles Langley was found to be acting within the
contract there was legal authority, the jury should have been instructed that Langley had
no authority to act in Utah and the Defendants needed to show a justification for force or
detention.
This Court should reverse the trial court and remand for trial on the claim of false
imprisonment.
E.

DEFAULT SHOULD HAVE BEEN ENTERED AGAINST ROBERT THORPE.
Plaintiff began the trial by moving to enter the default of Robert Thorpe who had

simply failed to appear at trial without explanation. (TT. R., p. 1187 at p. 7). The trial court
refused to do that stating that Plaintiffs' counsel clearly intended to ask that the jury be
instructed on default that Thorpe hired Langley to apprehend Gerald Lee, which was a fact
the court understood would be disputed by testimony of Mrs. Thorpe. Plaintiffs' counsel
pointed out that Thorpe had essentially ignored the case throughout discovery effort and
the practical effect to deny a default at trial would be to reward him for ignoring the court.
(TT, R., p. 1187 at pp. 16-19). Counsel further argued that the default of Thorpe could also
10

be imputed to Ranger Insurance Company as its agent. The trial court was unpersuaded
and refused to default Thorpe, though it could have ruled Thorpe was in default but Ranger
was not bound.
Later, Ranger Insurance Company, which had asserted a cross-claim against
Thorpe moved to have a default of the cross-claim entered for Thorpe failing to appear at
trial. The court granted that motion. (R., p. 1261).
The legal standard as to whether a default should be entered is that it is within the
discretion of the trial court.

Valley Leasing, a Div. of Intermountain Loan Corp. v.

Houghton, 661 P.2d 959 (Utah 1983). The question presented is, therefore, did the trial
court abuse its discretion in failing to enter a default against Robert Thorpe.
An examination of the record will show that Thorpe failed to show up for his
scheduled deposition. (R., p. 114). The record shows that he came to none of the court's
various hearings in the course of the litigation though he was clearly on the mailing list.
Thorpe never presented any information to the court suggesting he would not be at trial or
giving an explanation as to why he was not at trial. A fair inference of such conduct is that
he simply chose to ignore the court. The unfortunate consequence of ignoring the court
was that he got complete benefit of such conduct by having the claims of the Plaintiffs
dismissed against him though he ultimately did get caught on the cross-claim by Ranger
Insurance Company.
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The court's concern the default of Thorpe could be imputed to the principal for which
he was an agent was entirely misplaced. Ranger selected Thorpe as its agent and
expressly made him an agent as shown in Trial Exhibit No. 2. ( R., p. 999). That principals
are bound for the conduct of their agents is not a new concept in the law at all. Forsythe
v. Pendleton, 617 P.2d 358 (Utah 1980).
What Plaintiffs suggest to the court is not unusual in the law. In Murphy v. Crosland,
886 P.2d 74 (Utah App. 1994), this Court considered a statute that created responsibility
for certain corporate acts in individual corporate officers aside from the corporation. The
corporation had a default judgment entered against it and this Court recognized that the
individual officers could be bound by that judgment under the statute that created
responsibility in them for the acts of the corporation. The primary issue at trial was whether
those persons had, in fact, engaged in those acts. That Ranger Insurance Company would
be held responsible for the default of Thorpe is completely consistent with this case where
the agency relationship between them is clear in the record and there is a statute that
creates responsibility for the acts of Ranger's agents.
That the trial court abused its discretion in not entering the default of Robert Thorpe
is shown by the effect being to reward Mr. Thorpe for displaying contempt for the
proceedings throughout and by the court choosing to disregard the law of agency. The
court also ruled by anticipating the testimony of Mrs. Thorpe, which he had not even heard
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at the time of the ruling other than to be told generally by Ranger Insurance Company that
she would dispute that Langley had been hired by Thorpe.
The correct ruling would have been to find that Robert Thorpe was in default and
thereby had admitted the allegations made against him in the complaint.

Those

admissions which would have become the law of the case through the default were that
Ranger Insurance Company is a bond surety company and Langley was an agent of not
only Thorpe but Ranger Insurance, and that Langley assaulted the Lees unlawfully.
(Complaint at R., p. 3). The only remaining fact issues for trial would have been whether
Thorpe was an agent for Ranger Insurance Company and the amount of damages.
Thorpe and Ranger were not just Co-Defendants in this litigation. The evidence
presented by Ranger itself shows that they had a principal and agent relationship. Ranger
clearly had a remedy against Thorpe for any damage caused by a default of its agent as
established by the fact the court entered a default judgment in favor of Ranger Insurance
Company on their cross-claim against Thorpe.
The court's error is further demonstrated by considering the entry of the default
judgment in favor of Ranger against Thorpe. What the court did in entering the default is
recognize the agency relationship between Ranger and Thorpe existed so as to justify
entering a judgment on the contract documents against Thorpe for Ranger. However,
when the court refused to enter a default for the Plaintiffs against Thorpe, the agency
relationship suddenly became a barrier to enforcing the agency relationship for third-party
13

Lees. Keep in mind that the ruling of the court denying the default judgment against
Thorpe, as expressed on the record, was to protect Ranger Insurance Company even
though there was a statute in place, Section 31 A-35-601(2), that would have reached the
same result Plaintiffs sought by the default even absent a default. That is, Ranger
Insurance Company is responsible as a matter of law for the wrongful acts of its bail agent
and bail recovery agent. The court was construing away from the public policy expressed
in Title 53 that bond sureties be absolutely responsible for acts of bond enforcement
agents.
The correct legal result for the court in this circumstance would have been to enter
a default of Thorpe in favor of the Plaintiffs, hold that the default binds Ranger Insurance
Company under its agency relationship with Thorpe and the applicable law discussed
above.
This Court is requested to reverse the trial court to order that the default of Robert
Thorpe be entered and that Ranger Insurance Company, principal, be bound thereby.
F.

REVERSIBLE ERROR OCCURRED BY EXCLUDING LANGLEY'S JUSTICE
COURT ADMISSION.
Obviously, one of the key elements in establishing that Miles Langley did not have

authority to arrest was the fact that he had no Utah bail recovery agent license. As has
been pointed out above, the court completely ignored Utah's licensing scheme. The court
added to the error through a serious evidentiary error justifying reversal.
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As the record shows at p: 45, both the Lees and Langley were tried for assault in
a justice court. A trial was held and Langley was convicted of assault and the Lees were
acquitted. During the course of the justice court trial, Langley was asked if he had a Utah
bail enforcement license. He stated in the justice court that he did not.
Plaintiffs attempted to show by the testimony of George Lee that he was present in
the courtroom in the justice court and heard Miles Langley say he did not have a Utah bail
bond license. In fact, it was George Lee himself in the justice court doing the questioning
of Langley. As shown in TT, R., p. 1187, pp. 200-202, Plaintiffs attempted to offer the
justice court statement of Langley and the court found it to be hearsay, and refused to
allow it, thereby eliminating plaintiff's key proof that Langley was outside the law in making
an arrest.
Counsel for Lees argued that Langley's status was an admission by a party
opponent under Rule 801(d)(2) and a statement against interest under 804(b)(3), Utah
Rules of Evidence. Plaintiffs counsel also asserted that Rule 804(b)(1) excluded the
statement from the hearsay rule as former testimony. (TT. R., p. 1187 at 201-202).
The court said that former testimony under 804(b)(1) could only be established by
a "document". (TT. R., p. 1187 at 202). A review of the case law does not show any such
requirement. Utah has no case law on this point. However, Method of Proof of Testimony
Given at Former Examination, Hearing, or Trial, 11 A.L.R. 2d 30 at § 29 states that the
general rule is that the testimony of a witness in a former civil trial may be proved by the
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testimony of any person who was present and heard him testify. The element that Langley
be unavailable - he was dead - is met beyond question. There is virtually no Utah case
law which suggests that the former testimony needs to be in writing and George Lee was
completely free to say what he heard Langley say in court.
The court does not give an explanation in the record as to why it did not find
Langley's statement to be a statement against interest or an admission of a party
opponent. It simply sustains the objection and the trial moves on. An examination of the
rules of evidence shows that this key testimony should have been allowed.
First, Rule 804(b)(3), U.R.E., states that where the declarant is unavailable, a
statement which tended to subject the declarant to criminal liability is admissible. (See
Addendum E). Section 53-11 -124 makes it a Class A Misdemeanor under Utah law to act
as a bail enforcement agent without a Utah license. One would be hard pressed to find a
more clear example of a statement being one within the definition of statement against
interest.
Rule 801 (d)(2) makes admissible admissions by a party opponent. The rule allows
out of court statements where it is the party's own statement. Statements of admissions
are not hearsay by definition under Rule 801 and are not exceptions to the hearsay rule.
Langley's statement in the justice court to the effect that he did not have a Utah bond
enforcement license is an admission of his lack of authority to act in Utah.
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The court's exclusion of Langley's statement was later used in trial as justification
for supporting other adverse decisions against Plaintiffs. (TT. R., p. 1187 at pp. 222-223).
The trial court cited the lack of evidence of no licensing of Langley as additional reason to
support the defense theory of common law apprehension under a bail bond contract
thereby compounding the error.
This ruling excluding the evidence of no enforcement license requires reversal of
the case because it was a key element to show that Langley was outside of Utah law and
thereby without authority to act. This Court is respectfully requested to reverse the trial
court on this ground and to order a new trial as may be consistent with rulings on the other
issues raised herein.
G.

FAILURE TO ADMIT THORPE'S RECEIPT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR.
Another serious evidentiary error occurred when the court refused to allow Gerald

Lee to authenticate a receipt given by Thorpe to Lee. This receipt was proposed Plaintiff
Exhibit No. 5 found in the record at p. 986, Addendum F.
The context of this exhibit is that Langley said he was hired by Robert Thorpe to go
get Gerald Lee, that he got Gerald Lee in Utah, and that he brought Lee back to Grand
Junction and was paid cash by Thorpe for doing so. Mrs. Thorpe testified that her husband
never hired Langley, that Langley did whatever he did on his own, and that her husband,
who had not shown up for the trial, would not have paid Langley anything. (R., Video at
999).
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This point was essential to the trial because Mrs. Thorpe was attempting to cutoff
the chain of agency to avoid responsibility of Robert Thorpe for the wrongful acts of Miles
Langley and also thereby relieve her surety, Ranger Insurance Company, from imputed
liability.
In rebuttal to the testimony of Mrs. Thorpe, Plaintiffs offered a receipt signed by
Robert Thorpe showing that he paid $350.00 for the apprehension by Langley of Lee. This
receipt was created in the presence of Gerald Lee who saw Robert Thorpe actually write
it. Lee's proffered testimony at TT. R., at pp.277-278 was that he paid cash on his bond
to Robert Thorpe with Miles Langley standing there with them and Thorpe, in turn, gave
some of the cash to Miles Langley and wrote the receipt. The receipt said that Langley had
been paid by Thorpe for the recovery of Lee exactly contrary to the video deposition
testimony of Mrs. Thorpe. (See proffered Exhibit on 5 R., p. 986).
Defense counsel objected that the receipt was hearsay. Counsel for Plaintiffs
pointed out that this writing is an admission of a party opponent of a key element at issue.
The admission being that Robert Thorpe paid Miles Langley for the apprehension of Gerald
Lee contrary to the testimony of Mrs. Thorpe.
The court responded in TT R., p. 1187 at pp. 276-285 after discussion that he could
accept that it was an admission of a party opponent but then stated that the witness had
to be unavailable and Mr. Thorpe was not unavailable. The court stated, at TT. R., p. 1187
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at p.281 that there is "an interstate act" and Thorpe can be subpoenaed. The key evidence
was excluded.
The ruling of the trial court was clearly wrong and an abuse of discretion because
of the prejudice it works on the plaintiff. Remember, the issue at hand is whether to
believe the dead Langley that he was paid by Thorpe and Thorpe's wife testifies by video
deposition that her husband would never had paid Thorpe. Plaintiffs can't use Robert
Thorpe as a witness to rebut because he didn't show up for either his deposition or trial.
The receipt effectively tells the jury that Mrs. Thorpe is dead wrong.
Rule 801(d)(2), which governs admission by a party opponent, need merely be the
party's own statement of admission and is outside the very definition of hearsay. There
is absolutely no requirement about availability of the party and the court was wrong to rule
on that point.
The second problem with the court's ruling is the court apparently focused on Rule
804(b)(3) concerning statements against interest. (TT. R., p. 1187 at pp. 281-283). The
court looked to unavailability under that rule and said the plaintiff could not show
unavailability because of the interstate compact concerning witnesses. An examination of
the Utah Code shows that the only "uniform act" to which the court could have been
referring to is Title 77, Chapter 21, titled "Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of
Witnesses from Without a State in Criminal Proceedings". An examination of Title 77,
Chapter 21, shows that this statute governs obtaining witnesses from out of state in
19

criminal proceedings only. There is nothing in Utah law which gives civil litigants the power
to subpoena somebody to come to trial to testify from another state.
In short, the logic of the trial court was wrong on several levels. First, the document
had been properly authenticated by Gerald Lee stating that he had seen Robert Thorpe
write it. Second, the writing of a receipt of the arrest of Gerald Lee was a key admission
of agency on the part of Robert Thorpe that he actually paid Langley contrary to the
testimony of his wife and business partner. Third, there was no requirement of witness
availability under the applicable rules governing this piece of evidence.
A final concern ought to be that the practical effect of this ruling is to once again
reward Robert Thorpe for not showing up at trial. The trial court abused its discretion by
refusing to default Robert Thorpe and then telling the Plaintiffs that a key piece of evidence
cannot be admitted because they did not subpoena this defaulting absent Defendant to
trial under a law governing criminal proceedings.
That this error rises to the level of being reversible happens because of the context
of the offered receipt in the total case. Put plainly, Plaintiffs got whipsawed. The jury was
instructed in Instruction No. 25 that if they found Thorpe worked for Ranger Insurance
Company and Langley worked for Thorpe, there was lawful authority to make an arrest and
they could no-cause the Plaintiffs. At the same time, Thorpe was allowed to claim through
Mrs. Thorpe, Robert Thorpe being absent from the trial, that Langley did not work for them
and absolute rebuttal evidence to that point in the handwriting of Robert Thorpe done in
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the presence of live witness Gerald Lee was not allowed. The practical effect of this ruling
and the instructions given were to set up Defendant Thorpe so he could not possibly lose
the case. If he was the agent of Ranger, which Plaintiffs always agreed he was, then there
was arrest authority under the contracts and at the same time Ranger and Thorpe could
deny Langley was their agent with evidence showing Mrs. Thorpe was dead wrong being
excluded. This result is a clear abuse of discretion in the context of this case and
constitutes reversible error.
CONCLUSION
This Court is respectfully requested to find as follows:
1.

That under a standard of correctness the Eighth District Court erred in

applying a federal common law right under the bail bond contract for a Colorado bail
recovery agent to come into Utah and arrest and assault Gerald Lee and his innocent
brother, thereby giving the jury a legal justification for Langley's assault on the Lees.
2.

Plaintiffs request this Court remand the case under a standard of correctness

because the Eighth District Court committed reversible error by dismissing the false
imprisonment by false arrest claim under a finding that there was a common law right for
enforcement agent Langley to apprehend Gerald Lee in Utah and a fact questions remain
as to whether George Lee had been falsely imprisoned, also.
3.

This Court is respectfully requested to find that the Eighth District Court

abused its discretion in failing to enter a default against Robert Thorpe and asks that the
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case be remanded with an order that Mr. Thorpe's default be entered and the binding
effect upon the principal, Ranger Insurance Company, of that default also be entered
whereby Ranger Insurance Company is found to be bound by the acts of its agent.
4.

This Court is requested to hold under an abuse of discretion standard that

the District Court created reversible error when it refused to allow George Lee to testify that
he heard Langley say in a justice court trial that Langley did not have a Utah bail
enforcement agent license.
5.

This Court is requested to find under an abuse of discretion standard that it

was error for the District Court to exclude an exhibit of the receipt signed by Robert Thorpe
for the work of Langley in apprehending Gerald Lee where Langley had deceased prior to
trial and video testimony by Mrs. Thorpe was allowed denying that the event ever
happened.
Taking all of the errors into account, this Court is respectfully requested to remand
the case to the Eighth District Court for a new trial with the default of Robert Thorpe in
place whereby the issue of a new trial would be limited to whether Langley was an agent
of Thorpe, whether Langley assaulted or falsely arrested the Plaintiffs, and the amount of
damages.
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DATED this 12m day of November, 2004.
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.

G R E G ^
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Appellees
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Complaint
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Complaint
ROBERT P THORPS
RANGER INSURANCE CO.
DEFENDANTS

*
*
*

JURISDICTION
1,Jurisdiction is proper under U.R.S.
78-12-29
PARTIES
2.a. Plaintiff Georgee M. Lee has had legal residence at 1434 E. 4500 S
Vernal,Utah since October 1998.
b. Plaintiff Gerald L. Lee has had legal residence at 2281 S. 4500 S.
Vernal,Utah since May,1998.
2.a. Defendant Miles Walter Langleys0last known -ddress was 1264 Grand
Avenue Delta,Colorado 81416 and was employed part time as a bounty hunter
by A-1 Bail Bonds225 W. Grand Avenue Grand Junction Colorado,
>>.Defendant Robert P.Thorpe A-1 Bail Bonds 22.5 W.Grand Avenue
3rand Junction,Colorado.Where he is a Bail-bondsman.
c.Defendant Ranger Insurance Co.is a bond surety company P.O.Box
im? Houston,Texas 77252-2807.
FACTS
4.Both plaintiffs were at1434E.4500 S. Vernal,Utah
5.Plaintiff Gerald Lee was unemploy^u at the tiaij end had been seeking
imployment.
6.At approximately 2:00 P.M.April 2,1999. Defendant Miles Walter
•angley,being an agent working for A-1 Bail Bonds,and Ranger Insurance,
•ntered the Vernal,Utah area of Uintah County with the explicit purpose
f arresting and returning plaintiff Gerald Lee to Colorado on supposed
elony warrants.
7.At approximately 2:30 P.M. April 2,1999. Defendant Miles Walter
angley approached the residence at 1434 S.4500 S. representing himself

; M i l e s Langley of C h r i s t i a n B r o s . C o n s t r u c t i o n Co. t o p l a i n t i f f
>orge M. Lee, gained e n t r y t o t h e r e s i d e n c e . Langley t o l d p l a i n t i f f
iorge M. Lee t h a t he wanted to h i r e p l a i n t i f f Gerald L.Lee to work
r h i s company. Upon b e i n g i n t r o d u c e d t o p l a i n t i f f Gerald L. Lee
fendant M i l e s Walter Langley grabbed Gerald L.Lee around the neck
d s t r u c k him i n t h e head with h a n d c u f f s .
3 .--l^ir.tiv\: George M.Lee attempted t o s t o p t h e a t t a c k on Gerald L.
e,and was s t r u c k i n t h e mouth and n o s e , w i t h L a n g l e y s elbow then f i s t ,
i c h r e n d e r e d p l a i n t i f f George M.Lee u n c o n s c i o u s and s e r i o u s l y b l e e d i n g
t h e floor*
9.Defendant Miles Walter Langley drug p l a i n t i f f Gerald L.Lee from
,e r e s i d e n c e , l e a v i n g p l a i n t i f f George M.Lee s t i l l unconscious and
e e d i n g on t h e f l o o r .
10*De fend a n t Miles 7 a l t s r Langley a t no time when he was i n t h e
s i d e n c e i d e n t i f i e d h i m s e l f as a bounty h u n t e r , b o n d enforcement a g e n t ,
a n y t h i n g t o do with a bond agency.
LEGAL CLAIMS
The d e f e n d a n t s a c t i o n s w e r e / a r e a v i o l a t i o n of law under U.R.S.#
7 6 - 5 - 1 0 3 A s s a u l t and B a t t e r y
7 6 - 5 - 3 0 2 Kidnap
7 6 - 5 - 1 1 2 R e c k l e s s Endangerment
31A-35-601 Acts and Conduce ox B a i l Bond Agents
aims n o t l i m i t e d t o above s t a t u t e s .
R e l i e f Requested
1 . P l a i n t i f f s c o s t s for t h i s a c t i o n .
2 . T r i a l by j u r y on a l l i s s u e s t r i a b l e by j u r y .
3.Damages i n t h e amount of
Compensatory ft 50f)fOOP
Per Defendant
Punitive
it 500,000
Per Defendant

Respect f u l l y ^ u b m i t t e d O
George W.Lee
Vernal,Utah

DATE / ^ f
8W8

. 2 ^

ZOTJD

Addendum "B"
Statutes Cited

Title 31 A, Utah Code Annotated

VOLUME 2
Complete through the
1999 GENERAL SESSION

LEXIS Law Publishing
Charlottesville, Virginia

Ai

31A-35-601. Acts of agent.
(1) As used in this section;
(a) "Bail recovery agent" means an individual employed by a bail enforcement agent to assist the bail
enforcement agent regarding civil or criminal defendants
released on bail by:
(i) presenting a defendant for required court appearances;
(ii) apprehending or surrendering a defendant to a
court; or
(iii) keeping the defendant under necessary surveillance.
(b) "Bail recovery apprentice" means an individual
who:
(i) is employed by a bail enforcement agent; and
(ii) works under the direct supervision of that bail
enforcement agent or under the direct supervision of
a bail recovery agent employed also by the bail
enforcement agent, unless the bail recovery apprentice is conducting activities at the direction of the
employing bail enforcement agent that do not require
direct supervision.
(2) The acts or conduct of any bail bond agent or bail
enforcement agent, bail recovery agent, or bail recovery apprentice who acts within the scope of the authority delegated
to him by the bail bond surety, are considered to be the acts or
conduct of the bail bond surety for which the bail bond agent
or bail bond enforcement agent, bail recovery agent, or bail
recovery apprentice is acting as agent.
(3) The acts or conduct of any bail bond agent or bail
enforcement agent, bail recovery agent, or bail recovery apprentice who acts within the scope of the authority delegated
to him by the bail bond agent are considered to be the acts or
conduct of the bail bond agent for which the bail enforcement
agent is acting as agent.
1993

kM

Title 53, Utah Code Annotated

/v#

VOLUME 2
Complete through the
1999 GENERAL SESSION

LEXIS Law Publishing
Charlottesville, Virginia

A'K

^^-11-107. Licenses — Classifications — Prohibited
acts.
1) Licenses under this chapter are issued in the classifications of:
(a) bail enforcement agent;
(b) bail recovery agent; or
(c) bail recovery apprentice.
(2) A person may not:
(a) act or assume to act as, or represent himself to be,
a licensee unless he is licensed under this chapter; or
(b) falsely represent that he is employed by a licensee.
(3) The commissioner shall issue licenses to applicants who
aalify for them under this chapter.
X4) A license issued under this chapter is not transferable or
wignable.
1996
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11-108. L i c e n s u r e — B a s i c qualifications.
in applicant for licensure under this chapter shall meet the
owing qualifications:
(1) An applicant shall be:
(a) at least 21 years of age;
(b) a citizen or legal resident of the United States;
and
(c) of good moral character.
(2) An appHcant may not:
(a) have been convicted of:
(i) a felony;
(ii) any act involving illegally using, carrying,
or possessing a dangerous weapon;
(iii) any act of personal violence or force on
any person or convicted of threatening to commit
any act of personal violence or force against
another person;
(iv) any act constituting dishonesty or fraud;
(v) impersonating a peace officer; or
(vi) any act involving moral turpitude;
(b) be on probation, parole, community supervision, or named in an outstanding arrest warrant; or
(c) be employed as a peace officer.
(3) If previously or currently licensed in another state
or jurisdiction, the appHcant shall be in good standing
within t h a t state or jurisdiction.
(4) (a) The applicant shall also have completed a training program of not less t h a n 16 hours t h a t is approved by the board and includes:
(i) instruction on the duties and responsibiHties of a licensee under this chapter, including:
(A) search, seizure, and arrest procedure;
(B) pursuit, arrest, detainment, and
transportation of a bail bond suspect; and
(C) specific duties and responsibiHties regarding entering an occupied structure to
carry out functions under this chapter;
(ii) t h e laws and rules relating to the bail bond
business;
(iii) the rights of t h e accused; and
(iv) ethics.
(b) The program may be completed after t h e Hcensure application is submitted, but shall be completed
before a license may be issued under this chapter.
(5) If the appHcant desires to carry a firearm as a
Hcensee, the applicant shaU:
(a) successfully complete a course regarding the
specified types of weapons he plans to carry. The
course shall:
(i) be not less t h a n 16 hours;
(ii) be conducted by any national, state, or
local firearms training organization approved by
the Criminal Investigations and Technical Services Division created in Section 53-10-103; and
(iii) provide training regarding general familiarity with the types of firearms to be carried,
including:
(A) the safe loading, unloading, storage,
and carrying of the types of firearms to be
concealed; and
(B) current laws defining lawful use of a
firearm by a private citizen, including lawful
self-defense, use of deadly force, transportation, and concealment; and
(b) shall hold a valid Hcense to c a n y a concealed
weapon, issued under Section 53-5-704
1999

/«'!?

53-11-109. Licensure — Bail enforcement agent.
(1) (a) In addition to the requirements in Sections 53-11108 and 53-11-110, an applicant for licensure as a bail
enforcement agent shall have a ininimum of 2,000 hours
of experience consisting of either actual bail recovery
work, or work as a law enforcement officer for a federal,
state, or local governmental agency.
(b) The applicant shall substantiate the experience
claimed under Subsection (1) as qualifying experience and
shall provide:
(i) the exact details as to the character and nature
of the experience on a form prescribed by the department; and
(ii) certification by the applicant's employers,
which is subject to independent verification by the
board.
(c) If an applicant is unable to supply written certification of experience from an employer in whole or in part, an
applicant may offer written certification from persons
other than an employer covering the same subject matter
for consideration by the board.
(d) The burden of proving completion of the required
experience is on the applicant.
(2) An applicant for license renewal shall have completed
not less than eight hours of continuing classroom instruction.
1998

53-11-111. Licensure — Bail recovery agent — Requirements and limitations.
(1) (a) In addition to the requirements in Sections 53-11108 and 53-11-113, an applicant for licensure as a bail
recovery agent shall meet all of the requirements under
Section 53-11-109, but instead of the experience requirement under Subsection 53-11-109(1 Xa), a bail recovery
agent applicant shall have a minimum of 1,000 hours of
experience consisting of either actual bail recovery work,
or work as a law enforcement officer for a federal, state, or
local governmental agency.
(b) The applicant shall substantiate the experience
claimed under Subsection (1) as qualifying experience and
shall provide:
(i) the exact details as to the character and nature
of the experience on a form prescribed by the department; and
(ii) certification by the applicant's employers,
which is subject to independent verification by the
board.
(c) If an applicant is unable to supply written certification of experience from an employer in whole or in part, an
applicant may offer written certification from persons
other than an employer covering the same subject matter
for consideration by the board.
(d) The burden of proving completion of the required
experience is on the applicant.
(2) An applicant for license renewal shall have completed
not less than eight hours of continuing classroom instruction.
(3) A bail recovery agent may work as a licensee under this
chapter only as an employee of or as an independent contractor with a bail bond agency. A bail recovery agent may not:
(a) advertise his services;
(b) provide services as a licensee under this chapter
directly for members of the public; or
(c) employ or hire as independent contractors bail enforcement agents, bail recovery agents, or bail recovery
apprentices.
1998

53-11-120. Requirement to identify employing agency.
Upon request, a Hcensee shall immediately identify the
name, business address, and telephone number of the bail
bond agency for which the licensee is an employee or an
independent contractor.
1993

53-11-122. Requirements during search and seizure —
Notification of law enforcement agency.
A bail enforcement agent, bail recovery agent, or bail
recovery apprentice shall observe the following requirements
before taking action authorized under this chapter:
(1) identify himself as a "bail enforcement agent," "bail
recovery agent," or "bail recovery apprentice"; and
(2) comply with the notification requirements of Section 53-11-123.
i9»8

53-11-124. Penalties.
Any violation of this chapter is a class A misdemeanor,
unless the circumstances of the violation amount to an offense
subject to a greater criminal penalty under Title 76, Utah
Criminal Code.
1998
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77-7-3. By private persons.
A private person may arrest another;
(1) For a public offense committed or attempted in his
presence; or
(2) When a felony has been committed and he has
reasonable cause to believe the person arrested has committed it.
10fln

77-20-8.5. Sureties — Surrender of defendant — Arrest
of defendant.
(1) (a) The sureties may at any time prior to a forfeiture of
their bail surrender the defendant and obtain exoneration
of their bail by filing written requests at the time of the
surrender.
(b) To effect surrender, certified duplicate copies of the
undertaking shall be delivered to a peace officer, who shall
detain the defendant in his custody as upon a commitment, and shall in writing acknowledge the surrender
upon one copy of the undertaking. This certified copy of
the undertaking upon which the acknowledgment of surrender is endorsed shall be filed with the court. The court
may then, upon proper application, order the undertaking
exonerated and may order a refund of any paid premium,
or part of a premium, as it finds just.
(2) For the purpose of surrendering the defendant, the
sureties may arrest him at any time before they are finally
exonerated and at any place within the state.
(3) A surety acting under this section is subject to the
provisions ofTitle 53, Chapter 10, Bail Bond Recovery.
1996
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Addendum "C"
Excerpts from Trial Exhibit 2 (R. 999)
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E'Sppuf.
I hava raad »rx$ had axpJainad lo ma and undaniland Iha loUowing larmi and condilioni of RANOER INSURANCE COMPANY (harainaftar callad RANQER) axaculing Iha abova lislad Suraly Bail Bondt on my
bahalf:
J
I
1.

RANQER thai! h a U control and Jurisdiction ovar ma during Iht Itrm lor which my bail bond(i) ia aiKUlad and ihaH hava Iha right lo apprahand and lurrandar ma lo Iha propar official, at any lima

lor violation of my bail bond(a) obligation* lo Iha Court and RANOER a» provided by law.
2.
It ii undartlood arjd agraad that any ona of Iha following actions by ma shall conslHuta a braach of my obligations lo RANOER and that RANOER and/or ils Aganl shall hava Iha righl lo forthwith
apprahand and surrandar ma in jtxonaralion of my bail bond(s):
a.

I I I dipart tha |urisdidion of Iha Court without Iha.wriltan contanl of Iha Court ^nd RANQER, or its Aganl.

b.

I I I shall mova from ona addrass lo anolhar or changa my phona numbar without notifying RANQER, and/or ils Aganl.

THIS AOREEMENT mada between Iha undarsignad
*—>
II
harain aftai callad Indemnilof(s) arid RANGER INSURAI.NCT^OMPANY (hereinafter callad Company).
WITNESSETH:
WHEREAS. Iha Company hai executed, or it about lo axacula in bthalf of and/or al Iha instance of Iha indamnilor(i), Iha bond or undertaking daacribad in Iha lortgoirtg application, upon Iha tacurriy and
indemnity harain providad, which application it haraby ralarrad lo and mada a pari of Ihia agreement.
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of Iha execution by the Company of »uch bond or undertaking Iha Indemnitors) covenants) and agreefs) with Iha Company at follows:
1.
The Indammlor(i) will pay Iha Company, or id duly authorized agent, the premium(a) ipecilied m said appficalion aJ the timet and in Iha amounts therein staled.
2.
The Indemnitor^) wifl at all limat indemnify and keep indemnified (ha company and lave harmlait Iha Company Irom and agaimt any and all claims, demand!, liabilities, costs, charges, legal
leas, disbursements and expanses of avary kind and nature, which the Company shall al any time sustain or incur, and aa wall from aN orders, degrees, judgments and adjudications against the Company by
reason or in consequence of havirig executed such bond or undertaking in behalf of and/or at the instance of the Indemnitors) (or any of them) and will pay over, reimburse and make good lo the Company, its
successors and assigns, ail sums' and amounts ol money required to meet every claim, demand, liability, coals, expanse, sml, order, decree, payment and/or adjudication against the Company by reason ol
the execution of such bond or undertaking and any other bonds or undertakings executed in behalf of and/or at the instance ol the Indemnilor(s) and belore the Company shall be required lo pay thereunder.
The liability for legal lees and disbursement* includes all legal tees and disbursements that the Company may pay or incur in any legal proceedings, including proceedings in which the Company may assart 01
defend Mi right lo collect or to charge for any legal lees and/or disbursements incurred in earlier proceedings,
3.
The Indemniior(s) will immediately notify the Company of the making of any demand or the paying ol any notice or the commencement ol any proceeding or the fixing ol any liability which the
Company may be required to discharge by reason of the execution of any such bond or undertaking.
4.
The voucher* or oth^r evidence of payment by the Company, in discharge of any liability undar or incurred in connection with any such bond or undertaking, or incurred in connection with any
collateral held by the Company, shall be conclusive evidence against the Indemnrtor(s) of the lad and amount of the liability of the Indemnilor(e) to the Company.
5.
In the event the Company executes any bond or undertaking with Co-Sureties, or reinsures any portion of any such bond or undertaking, or procures the execution of any such bond or
undertaking, the Indemniior(s) agree(s) thai all ot the terms and conditions of this instrument shaft apply to and operale for the benefit of Ihe Company, the procured sureties and/or co-sureties and/or
reinsurers as their respective interests may appaa$,
6.
The Company shaH have Iha right at any lime, without notice lo the Indemnitor^), to transfer and assign this agreement and/or the collateral pledged hereunder, to any person. Reinsurer, CoSurety. Surety or insurance Company which may take over and assume in whole or in part, the obligation of the Company under any such bond or undertaking and (hereupon the transferee shaH become
vesled with all the powers and rights given to the Company hereunder and the Company shall be relieved and fully discharged Irom any liability or responsibility for said collateral under this agreement.
7.
The Indemnitor(ft) agree(s) that the Company may at eny time lake such steps as it may deem necessary lo obtain its release Irom any and all liability under any of said bonds or undertakings
and it snail not be necessary lor the Company to give Ihe Indemnilor(s) notice of any lad or information coming to the Company's notice or knowledge concerning or affecting its rights or liability under any
such bond or undertaking, noiica of aN such being hereby expressly waived; and that the Company may secure and lurther indemnify itself against loss, damages and/or expenses in connection with any such
bond or undertaking in any manner 4 may think proper including surrender of the defendant (either before or after forfeiture and/or payment) if the Company shall deem the same advisable; and all expenses
which the Company may sustain or incur m obtaining such release or in lurther securing itself againsttoss,shaH be borne and paid by Ihe Indemnitors).
S.
The Indemnilor(s) hereby authofiza(s) any attorney ol any court of record to appear lor him or them in and before any court, in any action, suit or proceeding, and receive process on behalf ot the
Indemnitor(s). or waive Ihe issuing and service of process, and enler or confess judgment, or permit judgment to be entered, against the Indemnilor(s), (jointly and/or jointly and severally) in favor of Ihe
Company, for the amount of any forfeiture which may be taken against Ihe Company on Ihe said bond or undertaking and for the amount of any and afi sums hereinabove in paragraphs 1. 2 and 7 lalanao" to:
and to release all error and waive isH right to stay of execution or appeal; and lo do and perform all acts and execute all papers in Ihe name of Indemnitor(s) in order to carry into elled Ihe authority hereinabove
given in as lull and ample mannler as the Indemnrtor(s) might do if personally present; hereby ratifying and confirming all that the said attorney shall do or cause lo be done by virtue thereof and Ihe
Indemnilor(s) hereby irrevocably wjratve(s) Ihe benelil or advantage of any and all valuation, slay, appraisement or homestead exemption law or laws of any stale of Ihe United Slates, now in lorce or hereafter
enacted.
I
9.
This instrument shall be binding not only upon Ihe Indemnitor (or Indemnitors, jointly and/or jointly and severally), but as waH upon Iha heirs, executors, administrators, successors and assigns of
the Indemnitors).
j
10. The Company reserves Ihe right lo decline to issue the bond for which application is hereby made, and no claim shad be made against the Company in consequence of its failure to execute such
bond; nor shall any claim be mada in case the bond, if executed, be not accepted by or on behalf of tha obligee.
11. The Indemnilor(s) hereby warrant(s) that the loregoing declerelions made and enswers given are Ihe truth without reservetion and are made lor the purpose of including Ihe Company to become
surety or to procure suretyship on ihe bond or undertaking applied lor herein, with Ihe intent and purpose that they be fulfy relied on.
12. The Company shaH hot be first obliged to proceed against the Principal(s) on any such bond or undertaking belore having recourse against the Indemnitors) or any of them, the indemnitors)
hereby expressly waiving Ihe beniefrl or any law requiring Ihe Company lo make claim upon or proceed or enforce its remedies against Ihe Principal(s) belore making demand upon or proceeding and/or
enforcing its remedies against any indemnitor.
13. The acceptance of ttys Agreement and of the Indemnitor(s) agreement to pay premiums on the execution and on Iha continuance of said bond(s) on undertaking^), and/or Ihe acceptance al any
time by the Company of the other collateral security or agreement, shall not in any way abridge or limit Ihe right of the Company to be subrogated to any right or remedy, or lima any right or remedy which Ihe
Company may otherwise have, acquire exercise or enforce under Ihis or any other agreemenl or by law allowed, and Ihe Company shall have every righf and remedy which an individual surely acting wilhoul
compensation would have, all su<h rights being construed lo be commutative and lor Ihe sole benelil of the Company, its successors and/or its assigns.
U.
II any provision or provisions of Ihis instrument be void or unenforceable under tha laws of any place governing its construction or enlorcemenl, this instrument shall not be void or vitiated thereby
but shaft be construed ami enlorctd with Ihe same eltect as though such provision or provisions omitted.
15. • In making application lor Ihe hereinabove described Bail Bond we warrant all of the statements made on the reverse of Ihis instrument lo be true and we agree to advise the Company or its agent
of any change (especially change! of address) within AS hours after such change has occurred and agree that any failure lo so notily shall be cause lor Ihe immediate surrender of Ihe delendant without any
liability lor Ihe return of any part of Ihe premium.
IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF we have hereunto set our hand and affixed our seals this .

3 Q

...O,

OOU

... RQ

JHE^PREMIUM PAHJLON THIS BOND IS NOT RETURNABLE
Defendant Signatui
Indemnitor

•&td

Signature
Name

Spouse

25

\J(f\flY\£{

j

Employer..

ejPersi
ReferencejPersonal
or Credit)

Tom

Relation

~et~v

t

BAIL BOND UNDERWRITING AGREEMENT
THIS; AGREEMENT entered into this 11thof March, 1998, by and between RANGER
JSURANCE COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation duly licensed and authorized to issue surety
ail bond powers of attorney in all bail states (hereinafter "RIC or "Company"), North American
ail Bond Services (hereinafter "General Agent") and Robert Paul Thorpe and Maria Elizabeth
horpe dba|A-1Bail Bonds (hereinafter "Agent" or "Bail Agent").
i

FORAND IN CONSIDERATION of the promises set forth hereinafter, the parties hereto
gree as follows;
1. • DEFINITIONS.
As Used herein, the terms "Company" and/or "RIC" shall be
ltarchangeable and refer to RANGER INSURANCE COMPANY or its designee. As used
ereinafter; unless otherwise indicated the terms "Bail Agent" and "Agent" shall be
iterchangeable. As used herein, the terms "bail bond/1 "undertaking,M "bond," and "power of
ittorney" sfjall be interchangeable unless otherwise indicated.
i

2. I GENERAL PURPOSES, Subject to the following terms and conditions, company
•hall supply surety bail bonds to Agent. Agent shall at all times hereunder remain a duly licensed
md qualified Bail Agent in Colorado as required by law. Agent may solicit and execute bonds in
my area injwhich It is duly licensed, has been Issued a qualifying power and been duly appointed
>y Compariy.
i

3. j RELATION OF COMPANY, GENERAL AGENT AND AGENT.
The relation of
Company $nd Agent Is that of principal and Independent contractor. Agent shall have exclusive
control ov4r his retail bail business, shall set his/her own working hours, and shall retain or
jischarge Employees or independent contractors In Agent's sole discretion. Agent shall not use
the name <j>f Company in any advertising for in any manner which induces a belief that Agent is
an employee of, or in any way associated with Company other than Company supplying bonds to
Agent in a! wholesale manner. Agent shall receive no wages, salaries, or other compensation
from Company. Agent is solely responsible for seeking out and obtaining any and all specialized
knowledge; and skills necessary in his or her professional function, and is similarly solely
responsible for the proper screening, selection and hiring of all employees and/or independent
contractors retained by Agent. Unless Company otherwise notifies Agent, General Agent will act
as Company's authorized representative with regard to this contract and Agent will perform its
contractual obligations with Company through General Agent. Also, unless Company otherwise
notifies Agent, General Agent will have the same rights of indemnification as Company as
specified in this Agreement.
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4. ' POWERS OF ATTORNEY. Company, through General Agent, shall furnish Agent
with bail bond Powers of Attorney in such numbers, denominations and al such times as
Company shall determine. Agent shall not allow any unlicensed or unauthorized person to
possess such Powers of Attorney, and upon receipt of Powers shall be solely responsible for
such Powers. Whenever demanded by Company or General Agent, Agent shall immediately
surrender or deliver to Company or its authorized representative any and all unused Powers or
Attorney. Should any Powers of Attorney be unaccounted for, stolen, or otherwise lost, Agent
shall report same to Company as unaccounted for, stolen or lost and unless otherwise directed by
Company, shall within seven (7) days, of obtaining knowledge of such deficiency, make full
premium remittance as herein described, within fifteen (15) days of the issuance of each such
Power of Attorney by Agent.
i

5. J REGULATION OF BOND EXECUTIONS. Company may, at its discretion, direct
Agent to rjefrain from executing, issuing or renewing Powers of Attorney on behalf of any
defendant/bond principal. Company may, in its discretion, set a maximum single undertaking
amount limit for Agent, and Agent agrees he will not issue any bond in excess of said limit without
first obtaining the express approval of Company of each such bond.
6. [ BOND COLLATERAL.
Agent shall solicit, collect, protect, insure, return, apply,
deliver to Company and/or otherwise deal with such collateral, be it real or personal property,
currency, securities or any other thing of value, as Company shall authorize and/or direct from
time to tim£ or as is required to protect the interests of Company hereunder. Company shall be
named co-trustee on any build up fund/reserve account, indemnity account, client trust fund or
collateral account, and is the intended beneficiary thereof. All cash collateral taken on Ranger
bonds will Ipe held in a separate cash collateral account and not be commingled with other surety
funds. Company shall be entitled to inspect immediately all collateral taken and all such accounts
of Agent, .along with any general business account(s), upon request by an authorized
representative of Company. Company may, in its discretion, direct Agent to immediately deliver
any and all collateral of any sort taken by Agent at any time as bond security to Company,
identified by bond number, indemnitor and principal, to be held in trust by Company until released
to Agent or directly7 to the party who gave such collateral, and Company shall be the beneficiary
of same. Agent will hold such collateral as a fiduciary in a manner which complies with all laws
and adminjstrative regulations of this state, and shall indemnify and hold Company harmless as
to any action regarding the taking, maintenance or return of such collateral. Agent witl provide
collateral indemnitor with a properly completed collateral receipt for each bail bond issued. The
signed collateral receipt given to the Indemnitor will show "Personal indemnification only, no
physical collateral, no cash" if no collateral is taken. Receipt will only be the receipt form provided
by Compajiy as part of Power of Attorney form. Where Company receipt form is not allowed by
law, Agent|will use only Company approved form, which complies with state law.
7.
BOND PREMIUM RATES, BOND COSTS, COLLECTION, AND REMITTANCES.
Company jshall have the right to fix and change bond premium rates to be charged the public.
Any premium rate increase, or related fee increase to the public shall be collected by Agent in
accord herewith and remitted to Company as herein provided. With respect to bond premiums
the following shall apply:
2
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(a)
Unless otherwise authorized and/or directed by Company, and without
regard to premium credit extended to customers, Agent shall remit to Company within seven (7)
days of execution of each bond all premiums collected for the Company by the agent.
(b)
The Agent's compensation shall be as may be agreed upon between the
Agent and the General Agent per the attached "Schedule of Charges.11
8.
AGENT DUTIES WITH REGARD TO BOND PRINCIPALS. Agent shall be solely
responsible for the negotiating, underwriting, securing and posting of bail bonds issued to secure
the release from custody of criminal defendants, and for the apprehension, holding, movement,
arrest, extradition and/or surrender of errant bond principals; court appearances of bond
principals; and/or any and all other dealing with bond principals; all such actions and dealings by
Agent shall!be conducted properly and lawfully in compliance with all laws, statutes, regulations
and pruderit business practices utilized in the bail bond business. Agent shall be solely
responsible' for any damages arising from, occasioned by, or in the course of an arrest or
apprehension, holding movement, extradition and/or surrender of bond principals. Should any
damages or legal action for damages arise from Agent's actions in the absence of written consent
from Compjany, Agent's contract collateral build up funds and/or Indemnity funds shall be
available fcir payment of any damages, defenses, or attorney's fees, and Agent shall hold
Company free and harmless from any and all damages with respect to the handling,
apprehension, arrest or surrender of any bond principal, or any other aspect of his or her bail
bond business transactions. Agent shall exercise extreme care in all respects with regard to
apprehension, arrest, or surrender of any bond principal, and shall exercise the utmost care and
caution in ttye selection of person to assist Agent in accomplishing these various tasks.
9.
AGENTS DUTIES WITH REGARD TO BOND ADMINISTRATION. Agent
shall be solely responsible for the satisfaction of bond forfeitures; Investigation of bond principals
and prospective bond principals; negotiation, settlement and/or satisfaction of claims against
Agent by bond principals, courts and/or others; and/or any and all other matters of bond
administration hereunder. Agent shall make, or cause to be made, any and all necessary and
warranted legal motions to preserve, reinstate and exonerate bonds, at Agent's sole expense.
Agent shalltimely pay any and all cost assessments imposed by any court for bond exoneration,
and shall b£ responsible for the payment of any and all judgments entered on bonds supplies by
Company. J Agent shall not bring legal action of any sort in the name of the Company or its
designee without the prior express written consent of Company. All legal actions and/or motions
related to bjond forfeiture shall be brought in the name of Agent or his or her agency unless the
laws of a particular Jurisdiction require otherwise, in which case Agent shall clearly designate
his/her agejicy status in such action(s).
10, ; NOTICE TO COMPANY OF PENDING ACTION. Agent shall notify Company in
writing, within seven (7) days of Agent becoming aware of same, of the initiation or existence of
any and allj legal or administrative proceedings wherein Agent is named defendant or the subject
of the administrative action or investigation. Upon request of Company, Agent shall supply
Company with copies of all documents related thereto, and shall supply Company with all
requested (nformation. This provision does not apply to bail forfeiture or summary judgment
matters,
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11.
NON-LIABILITY OF COMPANY FOR SERVICE. Company shall from time
to time, as!a courtesy, supply Agent with a listing of Agent's bond forfeiture and shall, in its
discretion and upon terms it may set, provide for the posting of transfer bonds for Agent.
Company in no way guarantees the accuracy of said forfeiture listing; Agent shall maintain his or
her own listing upon which agent shall ultimately rely. Company assumes to responsibility or
liability for the transfer bond process, or notice related thereto. Agent acknowledges the risks
involved with the transfer bond process and fully accepts same, holding Company harmless for
any and all josses related thereto.
12.
AGENT RECORDS AND REPORTS. Agent shall maintain such documents
and records and deliver to Company such documents, records and/or reports as shall be
authorized ^nd/or directed by Company, and all such documents, record or reports shall be open
and available for inspection by Company at all times. If Agent and/or Company terminate their
relationship! hereunder, for any reason, upon request Agent acknowledges Company's superior
claim to sajme and shall release to Company forthwith all records, documents and reports for
photocopying purposes. Within a reasonable time thereafter, but in no event to exceed thirty (30)
calendar d^ys, Company shall return said documents, records or reports to Agent, either by
original or dopy in Company's discretion. Agent waives prior notice should Company seek court
order to enforce this paragraph, and hereby stipulates Company is entitled to temporary, ex parte
injunctive qrders without notice to enforce these provisions, Agent will provide Company a copy
of any fornri or written communication associated with the writing of Bonds. Said information will
be supplied for information purposes only,
13.
TERMINATION OF BOND LIABILITY. Agent shall report any and all
terminations of bond liability, on a regular basis, but no later than fifteen (15) days after
exoneration Any and all bonds exonerated by operation of law or by Agent Initiated motion shall
be reporte|d, and the date of exoneration shall be noted. In Company's discretion, court
documents, evidencing liability discharge may be required of Agent Agent shall comply with any
request by| Company for status reports/updates on any large undertakings or forfeitures at any
time Company so requests.
14.
PRESERVATION OF COMPANY'S INTERESTS. Agent shall comply with
any and all procedural directions, rules, regulations and the like from time to time given and/or
adopted by Company, and unless otherwise directed shall make no alteration, modification or
amendment of any obligation or document of Company; enter into no settlement of claim in the
name of Company; keep confidential any and all such Company instructions and information;
make no reference to Company in any advertising; and do nothing whatsoever which may create
additional pbligations and liabilities for Company and/or impair Company's goodwill.
15.
AGENTS EXPENSES. Except as otherwise set forth herein, Agent shall
bear any 4nd all expenses incurred in the conduct of Agent's business.
16.
GENERAL INDEMNIFICATION. In addition to any and all liability the
following (nay have at law and/or equity for nonperformance of this Agreement, they shall be
jointly and! severally responsible to Company as follows:
(a)
General Agent shall indemnity, hold and save Company harmless for 100%
4
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of the liabiljty written and collateral attaching thereto; and/or
i (b)
Bail Agent shall indemnify, hold and save Company harmless from 100% of
any and alt costs, expenses and liabilities, including but not limited to, bond forfeitures, travel
expenses (including food and lodging), telephone and postage expenses, special assistance
fees, special employment expenses, investigators' fees, attorneys' fees, accountants' fees,
experts' fees, collection fees, trial preparation expenses, court costs, penalties, judgments,
judgment execution expenses and the like with Company may sustain or incur from time to time
as a result of, arising from, or in connection with the subject matter of this Agreement, including
but not limited to, execution and/or administration of bonds; collection of premiums; forfeiture of
bonds, audits by Company of and concerning any part hereto; investigation of bonds; negotiation
and settlement of bond claims; location, apprehension, holding movement, extradition and/or
surrender 6f bond principals; collection, protection, investment, transmission and/or application of
collateral; negotiation and settlement of charges, claims and demands of whatever type and
nature; and participation in any judicial proceeding, voluntary and otherwise.
17. J SPECIAL INDEMNIFICATION. In the event of breach of this Agreement by any
party hereto and/or any action by Company to enforce compliance herewith by any party,
notwithstanding anything else herein to the contrary and in addition to and not in derogation of
any and jail liability they or any of them otherwise may have at law and/or equity for
nonperformance of this Agreement, each party hereto, jointly severally, shall indemnify; hold and
save Company harmless from any and all damages, losses, injuries, costs, expenses and
liabilities, including but not limited to, loss of profits, business assets and/or goodwill, liabilities to
any party j hereto, liabilities to third persons, travel expenses (including food and lodging),
investigator's fees, attorney's fees, accountant's fees, expert's fees, collection fees, trial
preparation expenses, court costs, penalties, judgment execution expenses and the like which
Company imay sustain or incur from time to time as a result of, arising from or in connection with
such breach by any part hereto and/or such action by Company. This special indemnification
does expressly extend to and include any action brought for tortious and/or intentional
misconduct by General Agent or Agent, or by any person acting as their agent or on their behalf.
18. j INDEMNITY FUND.
(a) | As security for any an all Indemnifications set forth in paragraphs 16 and 17, and
without limitation to scope thereof or liability therefor, Agent shall forthwith deliver to Company a
cash sum'equal to 1% ($10.00per $1000.00) of the total amount of penal liability written for each
bond. The initial and subsequent deposits into, and the income therefrom and the investment
and reinvestment thereof, shall be known as the Indemnity Fund."
(b)
Neither said parties nor anyone else shall be entitled to notice of any action taken or
to be takep by Company hereunder provided, however, that company shall subsequently account
for and justify any such action taken in a manner consistent with proper fiduciary accounting
procedure.
(c)
Company may from time to time, in its sole discretion and for such values as it
deems appropriate, convert non-cash assets, if any, to C8sh either by sale or otherwise, and
shall, within a reasonable time thereafter, account for and describe such action to Agent.
(d)l Any and all taxes due and payable with respect to Income and/or principal of said
fund shall, be paid by the party making deposits thereto.
5
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(e) | Company may from time to time, withdraw, apply and/or reimburse itself with such
part or all of the principal and/or income hereof as may be necessary (as determined solely by
Company) to preserve and/or maintain said Indemnity Fund.
(0 ; If. when and as Company is elsewhere authorized under this Agreement to
withdraw, apply and/or reimburse itself herefrom by reason of indemnification, it may do so with
such part or all of the principal and/or income hereof as it shall determine.
(g)
Upon termination of this Agreement and after each and every indemnification
hereunder is finally exonerated, determined, and/or otherwise satisfied, that portion of said
Indemnity Fund then remaining shall be delivered to General Agent, and/or Bail Agent free and
clear of this Agreement.
19. j COLLATERAL.
As a condition of this Contract Agent, or if applicable, Agent's
indemnitor |shall provide to Company collateral which shall be agreed upon between the Agent
and the General Agent per the attached "Schedule of Collateral" which shall name Company or
its designeje as beneficiary. This collateral shall be maintained by Company to secure and
guarantee Agent's performance of all terms hereof, and shall be held, applied, liquidated and/or
returned to, depositor in a like manner as is described and called for in the above Paragraph 18
entitled Indemnity Fund."
20. | INDEMNIFICATION REMEDIES OF COMPANY.
When and as Company is
entitled to (indemnification under this Agreement and except as provided elsewhere herein for
bond forfeitures, in addition to any other rights and remedies it may have under this Agreement,
at law andyjor equity, Company shall have the right to do any one or more of the following*
(a) | Direct any party hereto so indemnifying Company to pay any part or all of the
underlying ;ioss, expense or obligation.
(b) | Pay any part or all thereof from the Indemnity Fund; and/or
(c) j Pay any part or all thereof and direct and/or make reimbursement to itself in
accordance with (a) and/or (b). All such rights of Company to reimbursement shall be primary to
any such rights of any other party hereto.
(d) ' Direct any party hereto so indemnifying Company to defend any action to protect
Company, ;or to refrain from defending Company in Company's sole discretion.
21.1 BOND FORFEITURES
Agent shall give Company notice within seven (7) days of
any and all bond forfeitures threatened and/or declared hereunder on bonds written hereunder
unless Company has received direct notice form the court Agent shall take any and all
necessary and lawful steps to terminate forfeiture liability within the applicable statutory time
frame. Wnen and as it shall be necessary to pay any such forfeiture or resulting judgment and to
the extent Company is indemnified therefrom, in addition to any other rights and remedies it msy
have und6r this Agreement, at taw and/or equity, Company shall have the right to do any one or
more of th'e following:
Direct any party hereto indemnifying Company therefrom to pay any part or all
(a)
thereof;
Pay any part or all thereof from the Indemnity Fund;
(b)
Pay and/or direct payment of any part or all thereof from any forfeiture collateral
(c)
held for such bond;
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(d)
; Direct the bond principal and/or anyone guaranteeing, assuring or indemnifying
Company, and/or any other party hereto against loss by reason of the bond principal's
noncompliance, to pay any part or all thereof; and/or
(e)
! Pay any part or all thereof and direct and/or make reimbursement thereof to itself in
accordance with (a), (b), (c)f and/or (d). All such rights of Company to reimbursement shall be
primary to any such rights of any other party hereto; any holder of interests in and to collateral
described in (c); and/or anyone described in (d).
i

22.
: PRESERVATION OF INDEMNITY FUND.
The Indemnity Fund shall not be
primarily liable for any Indemnification hereunder except insofar as Company may elect to satisfy
same therefrpm or as otherwise authorized hereunder. Should Indemnity Fund withdrawal be
necessary fof whatever reason hereunder, Company may, in its sole discretion, require Agent to
reimburse said fund in the amount withdrawn, either forthwith or in installments as determined by
Company.
23.
j FINANCIAL INFORMATION.
Agent will provide personal financial statement to
Company at Company's request Agent also agrees that Company may, at its discretion, request
and receive [personal credit information on agent from consumer reporting agencies. Agent
agrees to prdvide any reasonable personal financial information requested by Company.
24.
j ASSIGNMENT OF RIGHTS AND DUTIES. Company may, from time to time in its
sole discretion, in whole or in part, partially or fully assign any and all right and/or duties
established by this Agreement to any chosen assignee, with or without actual notice of such
Agreement t^> Agent. Company may contact, substitute, or join with any other underwriter, surety
and/or reinsured on any or alt bonds hereunder. However, whenever possible, such agreement
shall be evidenced by addendum hereto, executed by all parties to this agreement. No
assignment of any right or obligation hereunder shall be made by Agent without the prior written
consent of Company.
25.
j SEVERABILITY.
If any provision or item of this Agreement or the application
thereof is he(ld invalid, such invalidity shall not affect other provisions, items or application of this
Agreement vj/hich can be given effect without the invalid provisions, items or applications, and to
this end the brovisions of this Agreement are hereby declared severable.
I

26.
j FAILURE TO DECLARE BREACH NOT A WAIVER.
The failure of Company to
terminate oq declare a breach of this Agreement on a particular occasion when such action is
allowed hereunder shall not be construed, interpreted or pleaded as either an express or implied
waiver of the right to do so at a later date, nor shall it be deemed an express or implied waiver of
any right of Obligation hereunder.
27.
APPLICABLE LAW, VENUE AND FORUM. The Agreement is to be interpreted in
accordance {with the laws of the State of Texas. The parties hereto do hereby consent and
stipulate to the jurisdiction of the courts of the State of Texas for any action brought under this
Agreement, j
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28. ! TERMINATION OF AGREEMENT.
Any party hereto may give written notice at
any time, w th or without cause, of his or its desire to terminate this Agreement. Upon such
notice, Agent's right and duty to solicit and executed bail bonds hereunder shall immediately
cease and terminate. All other rights and duties of each party hereto shall continue thereafter
until final determination and satisfaction of the entire subject matter of this Agreement (including
the exoneration of nay and all bonds executed hereunder prior to such notice) and thereupon this
Agreement shall be finally terminated. Until all Company bonds issued by Agent hereunder are
exonerated or paid, Agent shall remain obligated to fully perform and protect Company as
described elsewhere herein.
29. , MODIFICATION OF AGREEMENT.
Each of the parties hereto acknowledges
that this Agreement expresses his or its entire understanding; that there have been no
representations made by any party hereto except as set forth herein; and that this Agreement
shall not be subject to change or modification except by execution of another instrument in writing
subscribed ^o by each of the parties hereto.
30. I ATTORNEY'S FEES.
Should any litigation arise between the parties hereto
related to this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney's
fees and coks in addition to any other relief granted.
WRITTEN NOTICES.
Any written notice given hereunder shall be deemed
31.
received by| the addressee upon deposit of the same in the United State Mail with proper first
class postage affixed thereto, addressed as follows:
(a)

If to Company:
Ranger Insurance Company
Attention* David W. Grobmeier
PO Box 2807
Houston, Texas 77252-2807

(c)

If to Agent and Agent Indemnitor:

(b)

If to General Agent Indemnitor:
North American Bail Bond Services
Attn: Darrell Sutherland
40087 Mission Blvd #386
Fremont CA 94539

Robert Paul Thorpe and Maria Elizabeth Thorpe
225 W. Grand
Grand Junction, CO 81501

32. i BENEFITS AND OBLIGATION OF SUCCESSORS. This
Agreement
shall
continue and run to the benefit of and be binding upon the estate, heirs, representatives,
transferee, i successors, and assigns of each party hereto unless such continuation conflicts with
an express term contained elsewhere herein, or with the intent of the parties as determined from
viewing thi? Agreement as a whole.
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused this Agreement to be executed
as of the day|and year first above written.

RANGER INSURANCE COMPANY
By.
David W. Grobmeier - Assistant Vice President

State of

Ulti^f)

County of

jJcObliU)

Subscribed ana sworn to before me this MhJ^ai
My Commission expires

of

) Y"U A l U

. 19 V Y
(Notary Publicy^/

NORTH AMERICAN BAIL BONfo SE

GENERAL ^GENT
By.
State

of Cl&hb rt^)L L <L.

JuRtiJi fy/ft<\

. County of _

Subscribed and sworn to before me this __/_
My Commissioji expires*
(seal)

day of

/)

k *<3xy-~,. 19ycP

/#

t <C C c-

(Notary Public)

rsssssssssssssssssssss
CAROLE POWER

^

COMM 11020190
HOWYPUBUC-CAUrOfWA

09
>-*

VENTURA COUNTY
My Comm Expires Mar n l , 1998

^
w

/HI

C/f~*4

BAIL AGENT

't

(X*j

4£~~~~^Z

/

&,-?*><* ~?//o<y&
(print name)
BAIL AGENt

State

-_£ 4 £i Kr ^ / u a

County of

AJJl/~ ru-^J^i.

)

)ss.
J

On
ftYarcL.
l\ \c\c\%
before me,
L l Acidc
U . ^ t i d e i (a.w
The undersigned Notary Public, personally appeared 0 1 a . c.4 q. Tin, n r o e
^u.<l
,
or proved to me on the basis of
^lobe a^
<>•< p<satisfactory evidence to be the person(s) whose name jafare subscnbed to the within instrument and acknowledged
to me that t4/sheAhey executed the same in bts«»er/their authorized capacity(ies), and that by hw/hef/their
signature(s) or) the instrument the person(s), or the entity upon behalf of which the person(s) acted, executed the
instrument.
!
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WITNESS my hand and official seal.

(signature of Notary Public)

(seal)
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Addendum "D"
Certain Jury Instructions Given and Rejected

AH3

Instructions Given

INSTRUCTION NO.

2$

You are instructed that if you find that Ranger delegated authority to apprehend
Gerald Lee to Miles Langley, he had the power to lawfully make an arrest.

INSTRUCTION NO, X \ *
If you find the airest was lawful, it was the obligation of the person being arrested to
submit to That arrest.

A-^

Plaintiffs' Instructions Rejected

A'MI

INSTRUCTION NO.

f

FALSE IMPRISONMENT INTRODUCTION
The Plaintiff claims the Plaintiff was falsely imprisoned by the Defendant and
suffered injuries as a result in one or more of the following respects: Gerald Lee claims
that Miles Langley had no legal authority to act as a bail enforcement agent in the state
of Utah. Mr. Lee further claims that when Miles Langley took custody of him by force that
a false imprisonment occurred.
George Lee claims that Miles Langley had no legal authority to enforce a bail bond
in the state of Utah and when he entered the home of George Lee and physically
assaulted Mr. Lee that he acted with the intent to confine or restrain George Lee.
Miles Langley has denied that he acted wrongfully.

Reference:
MUJ110.14

A'^l

INSTRUCTION NO. _k
FALSE IMPRISONMENT
The Plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the following elements to prevail on
a claim of false imprisonment:
1.

The Defendant acted, intending to confine or restrain the Plaintiff; and

2.

The Defendant's actions resulted in the confinement or restraint of the

Plaintiff; and
3.

The Plaintiff was conscious of the confinement or restraint or was

harmed by it; and
4.

The Defendant acted without having reasonable grounds to believe

the Plaintiff committed an offense.
A person is restrained when that person is not free, or reasonably believes [he]
[she] [they] person is not free, to leave a place to which that person has been confined
and does not consent to the restraint.

References:
MUJ110.15
Terry v. ZCMI, 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979)
Haas v. Emmett, 23 Utah 2d 138,459 P.2d 432 (1969)
Mildon v. Bybee, 13 Utah 2d 400, 375 P.2d 458 (1962)
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 35 (1964)
IJI § 42.34

h'W

INSTRUCTION NO. V

Be advised that Utah law requires that a bail recovery agent operate only when
licensed by the state of Utah.

Reference:
Title 53, Chapter 11, UCA.

A-53

INSTRUCTION NO.

<f

Be advised that Utah law allows citizens without law enforcement authority to make
arrests. The law provides, however, that such arrests may be made by private persons
only where there has been a public offense committed or attempted in his presence or
when a felony has been committed and he has reasonable cause to believe the person
arrested has committed it.

Reference:
Section 77-7-3, UCA

yq\

INSTRUCTION NO.
NEGLIGENCE - INTRODUCTORY INSTRUCTION
In this case the Plaintiffs claim the Defendant was negligent in the following
respects: Miles Langley, acting without benefit of a required license and legal authority
entered the premises of George Lee to make an arrest without authority and engaged in
a fight which caused the Plaintiffs' injuries.
To return a verdict for the Plaintiff, you must find by a preponderance of the
evidence that:
1.

The Defendant was negligent in one or more of the particulars alleged

by the Plaintiff; and
2.

The Defendant's negligence was a proximate cause of the Plaintiff's

injuries.
If you find in favor of the Plaintiff on those two questions, you must then decide the
amount of the damages suffered by the Plaintiff.

References:
MUJI 3.1
JIFUNo.2.4(1957)

A'^"

INSTRUCTION NO.

[6

RIGHT TO RECOVER FOR NEGLIGENT CONDUCT
A person has a duty to use reasonable care to avoid injuring other people or
property. "Negligence" simply means the failure to use reasonable care. Reasonable care
does not require extraordinary caution or exceptional skill. Reasonable care is what an
ordinary, prudent person uses in similar situations.
The amount of care that is considered "reasonable" depends on the situation. You
must decide what a prudent person with similar knowledge would do in a similar situation.
Negligence may arise in acting or in failing to act.
A party whose injuries or damages are caused by another party's negligent conduct
may recover compensation from the negligent party for those injuries or damages.

References:
MUJI 3.2
Mitchell v. Pearson Enters., 697 P.2d 240 (Utah 1985)
Meese v. Brigham Young Univ., 639 P.2d 720 (Utah 1981)
Covert v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 23 Utah 2d 252,461 P.2d 466 (1969)
Whitman v. W.T. Grant Co., 16 Utah 2d 81, 395 P.2d 918 (1964)
JIFU Nos. 15.1, 15.2, 15.3, 15.4 (1957)
BAJI Nos. 3.00 (1986), 3.10 (1986), 3.11 (Supp. 1992), 3.12 (Supp. 1992)
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Addendum"E"
Utah Rules of Evidence

A^"7

UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED

1953

UTAH COURT RULES
1999

State and Federal Rules
and Code of Judicial
Administration

LEXIS*
LAW PUBLISHING

P.O. Box 7587, Charlottesville, VA 22906-7587

www.kxislawpublishing.com
Customer Service: 800/562-1197
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Rule 801. Definitions.
The following definitions apply under this article:
(a) Statement A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2)
nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion.
(b) Declarant A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement.
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the declarant
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of
the matter asserted.
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if:
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing
and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the statement is (A) inconsistent with the declarant's testimony or the witness denies
having made the statement or has forgotten, or (B) consistent with the
declarant's testimony and is ofTered to rebut an express or implied charge
against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, or
<C) one of identification of a person made after perceiving the person; or
(2) Admission by party-opponent The statement is offered against a party
$nd is (A) the party's own statement, in either an individual or a representative capacity, or (B) a statement of which the party has manifested an adoption
ar belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by the party to
make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by the party's
agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or
employment, made during the existence of the relationship, or (E) a statement
by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the
conspiracy.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)

hb\

Rule 804. Hearsay exceptions; declarant unavailable.
(a) Definition of unavailability. "Unavailability as a witness" includes situations in which the declarant:
(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from
testifying concerning the subject matter of the declarant's statement; or
(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of the
declarant's statement despite an order of the court to do so; or
(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of the declarant's
statement; or
(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or
then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of the declarant's statement has been unable to procure the declarant's attendance by process or other
reasonable means.
A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if the exemption, refusal, claim
of lack of memory, inability, or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the proponent of the declarant's statement for the purpose of preventing
the witness from attending or testifying.
(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule
if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:
(1) Former testimony. Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of
the same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with
law in the course of the same or another proceeding, if the party against whom
the testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor
in interest, had an opportunity and similar motive to develop-the testimony by
direct, cross, or redirect examination.
(2) Statement under belief of impending death. In a civil or criminal" action
or proceeding, a statement made by a declarant while believing that the
declarant's death was imminent, if the judge finds it was made in good faith.
(3) Statement against interest. A statement which was at the time of its
making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or
so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render
invalid a claim by the declarant against another, that a reasonable person in
the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless believing it
to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and
offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.
(4) Statement of personal or family history. (A) A statement concerning the
declarant's own birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, legitimacy, relationship by
blood, adoption or marriage, ancestry, or other similar fact of personal or
family history, even though the declarant had no means of acquiring personal
knowledge of the matter stated; or (B) a statement concerning the foregoing
matters, and death also, of another person, if the declarant was related to the
other by blood, adoption, or marriage or was so intimately associated with the
other's family as to be likely to have accurate information concerning the
matter declared.
(5) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the
foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as
evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for
which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure
through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the
interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into
evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception
unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in
advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair
opportunity to prepare to meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the
statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the
declarant.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)

Addendum"F
Rejected Exhibit: Receipt of Thorpe
(on reverse of printed form)
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DEPOSITED

DATE
RECEIPT NO. /
POWER N O * * * R 5 - - J . 1 0 4 6 7 9 5 * -
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Received of.

(ADDRESS)

{NAME OF DEPOSITOR)

Social Sec. No.
or Date of Birth_
sum of $.
the follow;

on behalf of the defendant
tendantx.

1\

f\tL-

/L As security for the execution of this Bail Bond written in the

i_ii

TT

BY (Print Name).
(Signature).
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the \ 7#day of November, 2004, two true
and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANTS was mailed, first class,
postage pre-paid to:
Julianne P. Blanch
Snow Christensen & Martineau
10 Exchange Place, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Robert P. Thorpe
30471/2 A1/2 Road
Grand Junction, CO 81503
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